“It’s time to act before it’s too late” -the new ominous tagline featured in The Emergency Committee for Israel’s commercial trumpeting the need for action on Iran, rings with truth. It is time for America to act- act in a strategic way that will benefit the U.S. national security interest- and this means not undertaking a military strike against Iran.

The purely strategic implications of a U.S. strike on Iran will far outweigh any limited gains it may bring about and will be far more costly than many in the public realize.  Moreover it would ultimately leave the U.S. in a much weaker and exposed position, while creating a far more volatile Iran much more inclined to actually gain nuclear weapons capability.

As Micah Zenko at the Council of Foreign Relations wrote, “It’s true throughout history: there’s always the belief that the next war will go much better than the last war,”…and that when faced with a problem such as Iran people, “want to ‘do something,’…And nothing ‘does something’ like military force.” Thus while the public perception appears to be ‘drop a few bombs and stop the bad guys’ the reality of the situation is far more complex, and any strike will ultimately lead to a far broader and more devastating conflict.

To begin one can turn to former DIA analyst and current defense fellow at the Washington Institute, Jeffery White and his in-depth analysis on just how a U.S. strike on Iran would play out. As White notes from the outset, “While a war with Iran might begin in the military domain, it would likely expand to others, and while it might begin at the operational or tactical level it would soon encompass strategic and political levels as well”.

There is no denying the U.S. technological or military superiority over Iran. However one need only look to past and ongoing conflicts of the U.S. to see how this advantage can be outmaneuvered by enemies, and how the U.S. can find itself in a protracted conflict where by simply not winning, we lose.

Accordingly should the U.S. attack Iran, even with the most limited aim of striking its nuclear facilities, Iran would seek to expand and then protract the conflict in an attempt to erode the U.S.’s moral and commitment. One need only point to Iran’s conventional force structure, access to organizations such as Hezbollah, and strategic geographic positioning along the Strait of Hormuz, to highlight how Iran could widen the conflict.

As White surmises, the U.S. would quickly find itself, “involved in a “secret war” of terrorist attacks and special counter terror operations …a “political war” involving Iranian and allied diplomatic and information operations to weaken support from other states and actors … an “economic war” featuring Iranian efforts to disrupt the oil market… and a “social war” [that] would involve appeals to Islamic solidarity and attempts to weaken popular support…” White goes on to conclude, “In such a broad and protracted contest, the United States might not enjoy a favorable balance of advantages”.

Focusing primarily on the military capabilities of Iran and its allies, one can forecast what an Iranian response may consist of. For starters Iran has an arsenal of short-medium range ballistic missiles.

Short range missiles consist of the Fateh-110, Shahab-2 (also called the Scud-C), and CSS-8, though it should be noted that the “U.S. Air Force’s National Air and Space Intelligence Center estimates Iran has less than one hundred (PDF) short-range delivery systems”.

Meanwhile Iran’s medium range arsenal consists of the Shahab-3, believed to be ranged between 1,500–2,500 kilometers. Additionally in 2008 Iran also introduced the new Sajjil, which unlike the liquid-fueled Shahab-3, is solid fueled and can thus be launched in a matter of minutes instead of hours.

These missiles in turn would allow Iran to strike targets in Israel and Turkey, as well as U.S. instillations and forces in the region. Such attacks would have to be met with appropriate responses by the U.S. and its allies, expanding the scope of strikes from just nuclear facilities to military installations.

In regards to the straits of Hormuz, a report from Harvard’s Olin Institute for Strategic studies has shown that should Iran close the strait with mines, missiles, and small boats, “it could take many weeks, even months, to restore the full flow of commerce, and more time still for the oil markets to be convinced that stability had returned.”

Moreover Iran has first hand experience with naval engagement in the waters stemming from the Iran-Iraq war, and has tailored its current naval doctrine accordingly. Iran now emphasizes small, mobile, and hard to detect systems and ships, easily deployable mine capabilities, and land based cruise missiles.

Having learned hard lessons from previous naval engagements with the U.S., Iran would in a future engagement focus on a passive defense-“a defense without weapons [which] comprises a range of measures that reduce vulnerability and increase endurance against foreign threats.”

This would in turn allow Iran the ability to conduct asymmetric naval operations against U.S. forces, and disrupt or close the Strait of Hormuz.

Regarding Iran’s allies, Hezbollah now has access to far more advances missiles and rockets than in the past. This arsenal is now accurate enough to pinpoint military installations, and capable of launching 500-600 projectiles a day. Hezbollah also maintains its capacity to undertake terrorist operations against civilians and other targets, spreading the conflict throughout the region.

There is also the possibility that in lieu of a conflict, Hezbollah could gain access to Syria’s P-800 Yakhont supersonic cruise missile system, allowing it to strike targets up to 300km from the Lebanese coast.

Table 5. Reported Hizballah Rockets and Missiles

System                    Type                 Range (km)             Warhead Weight (kg)         Supplier

Zelzal-2                  Rocket                    210                                          600                                             Iran

Nazeat                     Rocket                    100–140                      1300(6)/250(10)                          Iran

Fajr-3                      Rocket                    43                                            45                                                 Iran

Fajr-5                      Rocket                    75                                            90                                                Iran

302 mm                  Rocket                    75                                            100                                             Syria

220 mm                  Rocket                    70                                            unknown                                  Syria

122 mm                   Rocket                    20–40                                      30                                          Iran/Syria

107 mm                   Rocket                    6                                              unknown                                Iran/Syria

M600/Fateh-110 Missile                   210–250                                  500                                       Iran/Syria

Scud variant            Missile                   300–700*                                985                                        Syria

* Depending on variant: Scud-B, 300 km; Scud-C, 500 km; Syrian Scud-D, 700 km. The Scud system is not confirmed to be in Hizballah’s hands in Lebanon at present

Additionally, despite its technological inferiority compared to Hezbollah, one should not discount the role Hamas could play in a conflict. While its capabilities rest largely on mortars and rockets, Hamas is still capable of striking critical targets in Israel such as Tel Aviv, further aggravating the overall situation for the U.S. and expanding the scope and complexity of the conflict.

Syria too may feel compelled to intervene in some manner, though it is largely preoccupied with internal dissent and thus currently may be unable to play any sort of leading role in the conflict.

Obviously Iran may not resort to all the tricks in its bag at once. Being a rational actor, and one that does not seek its own demise, Iran will respond with appropriate levels of force. However as noted these actions will be geared towards expanding the conflict towards a much broader field where the U.S. military and technological advantaged is reduced, in turn escalating the conflict.

Furthermore any strike against Iran will most likely be far greater than thought. As one ISIS report noted, “Limited bombing campaigns are unlikely to destroy Iran’s main capability to produce weapon-grade uranium…. Iran has dispersed its centrifuge program across many facilities, several whose locations remain secret. More importantly, Iran has mastered the construction of centrifuges and has likely even secretly stockpiled an unknown number of centrifuges…”

As such many analysts believe multiple sorties will be required, expanding the scope of a strike, and in turn the Iranian response.

Accordingly the U.S. will find itself in a much larger conflict than anticipated. It will become prolonged and will encompass conventional forces that are geared towards asymmetric warfare, an economic downturn and high oil prices stemming from the Strait of Hormuz, and non-state actors conducting operations across the region.

Soon U.S. escalation will be required to counter these challenges, and the U.S. will eventually be forced to admit its shortcomings or double down and undertake the now forsaken term ‘regime change’. Should the U.S. undertake the former, it will have to live with a further destabilized region, yet another military setback, and an Iranian nuclear program most likely delayed, but far from destroyed.

As the ISIS report concludes, “ An ineffective bombing campaign that does not eliminate these capabilities would leave Iran able to quickly rebuild its program and would motivate it to launch its own Manhattan Project, resulting in a Middle East region that is far more dangerous and unstable”.

White similarly concludes, “A beaten, humiliated but still defiant Iran with essentially the same political system and approach to the region and the world would be a long-term, growing danger similar to Iraq after the First Gulf War (or Germany after World War I).”

If the U.S. unwisely seeks the latter option, one need only turn to Iraq or Afghanistan to see where regime change leads.

In short if the U.S wishes another long term engagement that will lead to further destabilization, a huge  military and financial commitment, and an almost complete assurance of an Iranian commitment to procure a nuclear bomb, then it should start down the long road of ‘limited strikes against Iran’s nuclear facility’.

However should the U.S.  like to ‘act before it’s too late’ and undertake strategically responsible actions, it should refrain from such strikes and continue to engage with Iran.

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