If nothing else the Iran-P5+1 talks in Bagdad have helped lay the foundation for a breakthrough in the nuclear standoff. The task at hand is now how to build off the momentum of these talks and allow for at least minor confidence building measures to be implemented.

While simply addressing the core issues of Iran’s nuclear program and agreeing to a further round of dialogue was enough to hail Bagdad as a limited success, a repeat in Moscow will be utterly detrimental to the careful balancing act in play, and will most likely end current negotiations.

As skepticism of a purely civil Iranian nuclear program grows in light of the May 25th IAEA report highlighting increased 20% uranium enrichment, and the release of satellite imagery demonstrating sanitization efforts at Parchin, there is now more than ever a need to see tangible progress develop out of the talks. In particular, opposition to the talks in the wake of a second meeting with no substantial progress will results in a domestic political environment within the US unsuited for further negotiation.

There is also an equal need not to give in to the current bellicose rhetoric of hardliners that will only act to further box in negotiators at this critical juncture. Progress is needed and time is running short, yes. But this progress can come in many small forms.

The key is to maintain and implement positive confidence building measures that will help sustain talks and lengthen the timeframe to allow for major concessions on both sides further along in the talks, allaying fears on both sides.

One ongoing theme that has arisen among policy advisors has been the concept of taking the narrow question of Iran’s nuclear program and addressing it within the broader context of Iranian-Western relations.

Gary Hart, Matthew Hodes and Lee Hamilton recently wrote a piece in the Huffington Post entitled “Enlarging the Frame” that touched on this very point. Drawing from the recent work of Thomas Pickering and William Luers who have argued for an approach towards the Iranian negotiations that follows in a similar vain as Nixon’s trip to China, the authors advocate for the use of ‘analytical pillars’.

That is to say that by creating a list of broad U.S. interests, Iranian interests and mutual interests, one can begin to formulate strategies on how to move towards some form of agreement.  Using the highly publicized 2003 ‘Iranian Road Map memo’ –whose authenticity while questioned still outlines general strategic interests-as a framework, the authors suggest “…both Iran and the United States would want stability in the region, the end of terrorism, the reincorporation of Iran into the international community, and no war.”

Obviously these are long-term broad-based goals but they do help highlight the larger strategic interests at play, ones that are intricately linked to the nuclear dilemma. Furthermore by utilizing this list as an outline of additional joint areas of interest, one can begin to find the foundation for the type of confidence building measures that would facilitate a more fluid dialogue on the nuclear issue. Thus by moving the focus away from the main point of contention between the West and Iran, and towards points of potential cooperation, it becomes possible for a reciprocal process to develop.

One such area- piracy in the Gulf of Aiden- appears to have already been touched on during the Bagdad talks, and displays how these mutual concerns can come into play.

Increased cooperation in this field would act to further enhance positive relations and help forge some form of understanding, if not trust, between the US and Iran.

Similarly Iranian analyst Bijan Khajehpour has discussed some of the realties within Iran that could aid the West in offering concessions. For example Khajehpour argues that Iran has been largely driven to the table not by sanctions, but by the falling trajectory of Iran’s oil output over the past 7 years, and consequently the interrelated need to reset relations with the West.

Consequently one way to approach Iran on the issue of 20% enrichment would be to have the EU provide Iran with the newest carbon catching technology used in oil production.

This would not only address environmental concerns in Iran, but also help increase oil production. Furthermore it would be a sign of good will from the West and would not come at a cost of violating any sanctions as the technology would be provided by the EU and not the US.

Additionally Khajehpour has noted that the US could refrain from some of the behind doors ‘arm twisting’ it has implemented to further tighten its grasp on Iran. Again this would act as a sign of good faith without retracting current sanctions. These are just examples of some of the out of the box thinking that has taken place, and demonstrate how countries can link the nuclear issue to a much broader context where negotiations can take place more easily.

The key will be to find and exploit the common areas of interest between Iran and the West, allowing for confidence building measures to be implemented and allow for momentum to be sustained. Should this fail to come about then negotiations will most likely be in a far more difficult, if not impossible position, as domestic politics come to take their toll.

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