Ukrainian Uranium
Great news for those concerned with the safety and security of vulnerable nuclear material: the United States and Ukraine signed a memorandum of understanding which formalizes a 2010 commitment to completely remove Ukraine’s highly enriched uranium (HEU) stockpile by early 2012.
As part of the deal, the U.S. agreed to complete the construction of a $25 million nuclear research facility in Ukraine by 2014. Additionally, the U.S. will continue to help Ukraine modernize various nuclear facilities to run on low enriched Uranium (LEU), which is safer. In a country still undertaking efforts to contain the aftermath of Chernobyl, this is a worthwhile effort.
This deal is noteworthy, especially as stories continue to circulate about possible nuclear material in the hands of non-state actors.
The total cost of this agreement is estimated to exceed $60 million—a small price to pay for this type of security. In fact, based on 2011 figures, that’s less than half the cost of a single F-22 Raptor. In addition to removing the physical threat of nuclear material, the United States’ agreement to help build the nuclear research facility in Ukraine also reduces the threat of potentially vulnerable knowledge.
It’s important to understand that the material to build nuclear or radiological weapons is only one component of a nuclear capability. The intellectual capital to do so is another major component. By ensuring that nuclear scientists remain employed, we reduce the risk that disgruntled or financially desperate nuclear scientists will sell their vulnerable knowledge to aggressor nations or terrorist groups.
The 2010 Nuclear Security Summit significantly raised the profile of this vital issue. With eyes set on the next Summit in 2012, the United States also must consider ways to get more concrete, verifiable commitments out of this international meeting.
This means the next Summit will have to produce something more substantial than a restatement of principles. This could include an effort such as enlisting the IAEA to monitor progress on an actual binding agreement. As the 2010 Summit had no enforcement or monitoring mechanisms, this is something that policymakers should look to correct in 2012, supporting the ultimate goal of securing nuclear materials worldwide in a timely, verifiable manner.
