"*" indicates required fields

The Mecca Joint Defense Agreement Isn’t a Retrenchment Win, It’s a Warning The Clocktowers at night, where the MJDA was signed on Sunday. Photo by saudipics, CC BY-SA 4.0 (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/)

The Mecca Joint Defense Agreement Isn’t a Retrenchment Win, It’s a Warning

share this

On August 7th, Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan signed the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement (MJDA), a mutual defense pact between the three countries which has drawn comparisons to NATO’s article 5. The MJDA is not meant to be a replacement of the members’ existing relationships with the U.S. Instead, the agreement increases the security of all parties by institutionalizing their relationships to share the benefits of one another’s asymmetrical economic, diplomatic, and security advantages.

On Sunday, President Trump celebrated the formation of the MJDA, saying “it shows that the Middle East is coming together and … will finally be able to defend [itself] in a more meaningful way.” That claim remains untested. What will actually trigger the agreement, and whether the parties will actually follow through with their obligations remains to be seen. Thus far the Saudis have yet to call their partners to their aid in response to Houthi attacks since the signing of the agreement.

Trump appears to see the MJDA as a sign that his policy of retrenchment is producing positive results, as U.S. partners are turning to regional and multilateral cooperation while the U.S. takes a step back. America’s partners in the Middle East lessening their reliance on the U.S. could be a favorable outcome for Washington. If U.S. partners and allies were to actually become more self-reliant and take charge of their regional stability, this could be beneficial for the U.S. and its security goals.  The U.S. would be able to offload costs to its partners and allies who would be encouraged to increasingly rely upon their own regional multilateral agreements. This would allow the U.S. to better focus its limited resources on the most pressing security threats, and possibly enable a reduction of its bloated defense budget.

With all of that said, the MJDA is not a result of a successful U.S. retrenchment strategy. The MJDA was formed in response to the economic hardship and destruction brought on by the ongoing U.S. war with Iran. While the U.S. is allied with all parties to the MJDA, the timing of this agreement indicates that its parties now see the U.S. as an unreliable and unpredictable partner and seek to hedge their reliance on its security umbrella.

Offshore balancing, a minimalist grand strategy that envisions a reduction in overseas military presence and a handoff of primary responsibility for regional security to local powers, is not an approach to be taken lightly. The U.S. must be an active party in coordinating and shaping a lattice of international partnerships in order to prevent power vacuums and instability. Additionally, the U.S. must avoid pushing its partners toward alternative security systems and institutions that could gradually reduce their alignment with Washington. U.S. influence and power in the Middle East have waned as a result of the Iran War. Still, the U.S. retains many ways to recoup its influence even if it is not the primary provider of security for its regional partners.

By utilizing political power, economic incentives, security technology and intelligence sharing arrangements, as well as maintaining existing security guarantees, the U.S. can ensure the stability of a more decentralized security structure. The MJDA may still lead to a more stable Middle East despite its poor origins. The pact is open to expansion, and multiple candidates have already been discussed by both officials and experts on the matter. The U.S. has close relationships with many of the potential candidate countries and could use its influence to steer the trajectory of the MJDA, cultivating it into a powerful regional alliance while discouraging expansion that would decrease U.S. influence.

America’s disregard for its partners has driven them to hedge against the U.S. This is indicative of a loss of power, not cause for celebration. While it’s desirable for U.S. allies to become more capable, the development of total self-reliance without a coordinated plan could lead to more independent foreign policy decisions by those allies that jeopardize America’s own regional objectives. The U.S. should neither disregard its allies nor risk harm to them simply to offload costs. If the U.S. is to successfully pursue a policy of retrenchment, it must undertake a controlled, diplomatically stable approach that encourages burden sharing while preserving U.S. power and influence. While the MJDA’s origins will be defined by American failures, the formation of the pact is an opportunity. If the U.S. is able to capitalize on this moment, it may be able to create an environment that is conducive to the administration’s goal of reducing the U.S.’s military presence overseas.