The 2026 National Defense Strategy Fails to Provide a True Pathway to Achieving U.S. Foreign Policy Goals
This article originally appeared on Aljazeera.net on January 29, 2026.
Following the release of the 2025 National Security Strategy in December, January’s release of the 2026 National Defense Strategy is a welcome contrast in tone. The National Security Strategy (NSS) was rife with controversial and uncomfortable language that read as a set of grievances instead of a coherent, unifying strategy for American security and foreign policy. The National Defense Strategy (NDS), in comparison, appears to be a more reasonably written approach to connecting strategy with foreign policy goals. However, on a closer look, the NDS’s broad proclamations leave a lot to be desired when it comes to connecting rhetoric and action to stated foreign policy goals.
The NDS identifies four key issues to be addressed by the newly relabeled Department of War: defending the U.S. homeland, deterring China, increasing burden sharing with allies and partners, and supercharging the U.S. defense industrial base. At first glance, these goals seem reasonable, even laudable, but they do not exist in a vacuum of rhetoric or action. A sense of frustration is palpable throughout the NDS, particularly noting that America’s allies simply have not contributed enough to their own defense or to the collective defense of alliances like NATO. The central theme is clear: America’s allies need to do much more, but in the meantime, the U.S. is going to do what it wants to secure its immediate interests and the world should take notice.
As part of a strategy to encourage increased defense spending and burden sharing, the NDS notes several times that the U.S. will “incentivize and enable” its allies to do so. These incentives have not been evident in the White House’s rhetoric. It appears to be quite the opposite, as the Trump administration routinely supports the imposition of tariffs to cajole and coerce America’s friends. Take, for instance, the recent controversy over Greenland, which President Trump indicated the U.S. would have “one way or the other.” Ironically, Trump threatened sanctions against American allies that sent military forces to boost Greenland’s defense—a move that completely undermines a proclaimed desire to “incentivize and enable” greater defense contributions. Fortunately, it appears Trump has backed down from his territorial demands, for now.
With the NDS’ insistence that America’s allies must do more, it’s fascinating that it identifies Israel as a “model U.S. ally,” despite Israel requiring significant direct U.S. military assistance on numerous occasions in 2025. It may be, that by “enabling” U.S. allies, the NDS simply means providing the rhetorical and material support necessary for them to pursue their own military goals without restraint or interference.
The NDS also outlines the threats posed by Iran, North Korea, Russia, and China, and reinforces the NSS’s notion that an “America First” strategy must “evaluate, sort, and prioritize.” Noting, in particular, that the Indo-Pacific will soon comprise half the global economy, the NDS explains that Chinese dominance of this region could potentially serve as a “veto” to American access to the world’s “economic center of gravity.” To counter this threat, it highlights a need to bolster “deterrence by denial” by allies in the First Island Chain. It does not truly explain how the U.S. will increase cohesiveness and competence amongst these allies in order to reinforce concepts of collective self-defense, especially when a collective NATO-like agreement does not exist. It would however, require that the countries along this chain, particularly Japan, the Philippines, and Taiwan, possess enough will and military resources to be able to put up a formidable resistance against any potential Chinese incursion.
While the NDS centers on the concept of the United States focusing more on itself as allies take up the burden of their own defense, the actions taken over the past year demonstrate an almost deliberate desire for optional distractions rather than a focus on the core military threats to the country or its alliances. For example, the confrontation over Greenland was entirely unnecessary as America already had a treaty granting military access to the island and the threats endangered the very premise of NATO itself. The decision to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities was optional, but was undoubtedly encouraged by Israel’s partially successful but incomplete attack on the country. The operation to remove Nicolas Maduro from power in Venezuela was also optional.
The Trump administration’s willingness to use and threaten force in multiple areas around the world simultaneously sends a clear message to America’s adversaries and allies alike: it is easy to embroil the U.S. in superfluous conflict. While seeking to deter, this enthusiasm to use military force may in reality provide an opportunity to distract, bog down, and thin out the ability for the American military to respond a major crisis. This further accentuates the need for allies to be able to fend for themselves, because America may simply be too busy to help out. China is undoubtedly taking note.
The United States faces no small number of challenges around the world, and the country’s leadership is expressing a clear desire to address these challenges without hesitation or nuance. The Trump administration operates on the premise that strength and decisiveness together comprise the keystone of foreign policy success. With this way of thinking, an apparent lack of inhibition could see the type of strong leadership and action necessary to resolve those challenges. But following a “might makes right” attitude without a solid understanding of the nuance of those challenges is more likely to result in long term disaster. Perhaps this is where the National Defense Strategy serves as warning to other countries: unless you have the resources to contribute directly to the interests of the United States or you hold an ability to inflict pain on it, your opinion and your needs don’t matter. So if you want a say, get your affairs in order and step up to the plate, because if you can’t meaningfully address an international issue, then America may do it on its own, and you may not like the result.
