Photo: Viacheslav Ratynskyi / the Collection of war.ukraine.ua
Taiwan Ambitions Fuel China’s Support in the Ukraine War
On February 4, 2022, China and Russia entered a ‘No Limits’ Strategic Partnership to counter the global influence of the United States. 20 days later, Russian President Vladimir Putin launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Although the People’s Republic of China (PRC) claims to be impartial in the war, the connection between Russian aggression in Europe and Chinese objectives in the Indo-Pacific is stronger than it seems.
China contributes to the Russian war in Ukraine by supplying arms, technology, and manpower. The U.S. Department of State assesses that China provides 80% of the dual-use technologies—materials that are suitable for both military and civilian use—that Moscow needs to sustain the war. Former Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines testified in May 2025 that these exports have shifted the momentum of the conflict in Russia’s favor. Additionally, China expands Moscow’s military recruitment pool by allowing Russian recruitment ads to bypass social media censorship and target Chinese civilians. Over 200 PRC citizens1,2,3 have been recruited to fight alongside Russian forces, with financial incentives up to approximately $28,000.
Beijing supports its strategic partner for two main reasons: to gain secondhand war experience and to ensure Russia’s reciprocity in a future Taiwan invasion. War experience is crucial to achieving Beijing’s “One China” objectives in Taiwan because the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has limited combat experience beyond border conflicts. The last major war China experienced—the Sino-Vietnamese War in 1979—resulted in a withdrawal of PLA troops, a failure Beijing cannot afford in Taiwan. As such, Beijing closely observes global conflicts for secondhand experience in war. U.S. officials say Russia is giving China unprecedented access to its sensitive military technology and insights about the critical vulnerabilities of Western weapons systems in exchange for their help in Ukraine.
The PRC also provides material support to Russia because it relies on the Kremlin’s longevity to achieve its reunification goals in Taiwan. China needs Russia to back the PRC, deter foreign intervention, and ensure military and diplomatic support during a Taiwan invasion. Thus, Beijing is indebting Moscow with aid to compel its reciprocity in a crisis over the island. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte anticipates that Chinese President Xi Jinping will instruct Putin to occupy Western forces in Europe and attack NATO territory before or during a Taiwan invasion. This strategy, however, may be infeasible if Moscow suffers an overwhelming loss in Ukraine. Losing a major ally like Russia would disrupt Beijing’s attack plans and give Western forces the opportunity to regroup and redirect their resources from the war in Ukraine to Taiwan Strait deterrence.
Recent U.S. political decisions have alternated between increasing and decreasing support in the European conflict. Earlier this month, the U.S. halted shipments of air defense missiles for Ukraine due to supply concerns. The decision was driven by Pentagon policy chief Elbridge Colby, a long-term advocate for reducing U.S. obligations in Europe and the Middle East to prepare for a conflict with China. The administration’s approach shifted on July 14, however, when President Donald J. Trump voiced his intent to sell U.S. weapons to NATO so that allies can dispatch them to Ukraine. The President’s current stance on arming Ukraine has positive implications for the country, and by extension, Taiwan.
China has everything to lose from a total Russian defeat. Similarly, a Ukrainian defeat has international implications for the stability of democratic institutions. Continued U.S. support to Ukraine combats both Russia and China by stunting the Kremlin’s victory and Beijing’s pursuit of Taiwan. With that in mind, defending Ukraine today is critical to defending Taiwan tomorrow.
