Part of China’s Space Infrastructure Diplomacy
Espacio Lejano Ground Station, located in Neuquén Province, Argentina. “Antena de la CONAE-CLTC Neuquén” by Casa Rosada is licensed under CC BY 2.5 AR.
By Samuel Dumesh, July 14, 2025
On a clear night in the Argentine Andes, a massive white dish rises silently from the plains, linking the remote Patagonian sky directly to Beijing. Nearly a decade after its construction, the Espacio Lejano Space Station—ostensibly a civilian scientific facility based in Neuquén province—is a tangible monument to China’s embedding of dual-use capabilities within foreign critical infrastructure. Both China and Argentina saw opportunity in Espacio Lejano, though for markedly different reasons.
For China, Espacio Lejano filled a blind spot in its global deep-space tracking network, providing uninterrupted coverage of polar orbits and lunar missions. While framed as a contribution to scientific missions under the Belt and Road Initiative, China’s lack of distinction between civilian and military satellite operators meant the station was equally valuable for filling military blind spots.
For Argentina, economically strained and isolated from Western credit markets in the early 2000s, it offered scientific prestige, foreign investment, and symbolic membership in the club of spacefaring nations. Beijing’s offer bundled low-cost infrastructure, technical expertise, and generous financing into a single package that no Western actor matched. Private sector interests in the U.S. were unable or unwilling to compete with their Chinese state-subsidized competitors, hampered by commercial risk and lacking coordinated diplomatic backing. This led Argentine officials to frame the project as a leap forward in national science and international cooperation, even as it carried clear strategic payoffs for China.
China’s financing then translated into de facto operational supremacy and substantial operational control. The station was built in 2017 and is operated by the China Satellite Launch and Tracking Control General (CLTC), which was then a direct arm of China’s People’s Liberation Army Strategic Support Force (PLASSF). CLTC also maintains the 50-year lease that began in 2014. Argentinian scientists receive only ten percent of total operating hours (fewer than two hours a day), while China holds expansive control over the facility’s day-to-day operations, software, firmware, and personnel. Functionally, this dynamic has rendered Espacio Lejano a keystone node in China’s global telemetry, tracking, and command (TT&C) architecture. Through antennas in the S-, X-, and Ka-bands, the station supports deep-space probes and high-volume data transfers to Beijing, and uninterrupted communications coverage in the South Atlantic. Local officials are prevented from “interfering or interrupting” any activities on the site, including implementing or requesting third-party verification measures.
Although nominally civilian, this lack of oversight means the site lacks any formal restrictions to prevent military use. The CLTC’s inextricable ties to PLA organizations underscore Espacio Lejano’s integration into China’s broader military-civil fusion strategy. Reports indicate that senior Chinese military officials were present during the station’s groundbreaking ceremony. Concerns have been noted that the PLA could exploit the station for The same enhancement of China’s Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)
Institutional developments have only reinforced these concerns. In April 2024, China disbanded CLTC’s parent branch, PLASSF, tasked with space, cyber, and electronic warfare. Control of its operations, including the CLTC, was transferred to the newly created PLA Aerospace Force (PLAAF) under the Central Military Commission (CMC), chaired by Xi Jinping. This means the same unit that operates Neuquén station is under the direct authority of the PLA department responsible for counterspace and electronic warfare.
U.S. officials have taken notice, issuing strong warnings. General Laura Richardson and other U.S. officials have publicly expressed concern over the potential military use of the facility. The spokesman for the White House National Security Council (NSC) described the ground station as “another example of opaque and predatory Chinese dealings that undermine the sovereignty of host nations.” Her predecessor, Adm. Craig Faller, testified that China “may have the ability to monitor and potentially target U.S., allied, and partner space activities,” and could already be in violation of its scientific mandate.
Espacio Lejano may have begun as a symbol of international cooperation, but now offers a preview of Chinese military-civil space integration. Beijing’s ground station in Argentina is now under the direct command of the PLA’s highest military authority, and it can be repurposed for military applications at any moment without requiring civilian renegotiation or local disclosure. The precedent it sets is not just stark but could be quietly scaled elsewhere under the same model of opaque financing, minimal transparency, and long-term leases. As geopolitical competition in space accelerates, the strategic value of stations like Espacio Lejano for China and, therefore, the U.S., grows ever higher. These facilities could support operations that monitor allied satellites, disrupt communications, or even enable counter-space attacks. If left unchallenged, this approach could expand China’s global military footprint by slowly capturing critical infrastructure cloaked in scientific ambition.
