A B-2 Spirit stealth bomber test drops a GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrator. USAF image.
ASP in Al Jazeera: Many Choices Ahead as the U.S. Weighs Striking Iran
As U.S. forces move into the region, the course of the rapidly evolving conflict between Israel and Iran will hinge on a series of strategic decisions made over the next few days or weeks. With Israel unlikely to completely destroy Iran’s nuclear program on its own, there will be increasing temptation for the U.S. to step in and finish the job as the remaining chance for diplomacy evaporates. With President Donald J. Trump stating that he prefers a “real end” to this conflict, he may become inclined to deliver that finality as opposed to leaving an open-ended question about the state of Iran’s nuclear ambitions. In President Trump’s eyes, that “real end” requires the destruction or surrender of Iran’s nuclear enrichment program.
The trajectory of Iran’s nuclear program over the past decade reflects a series of critical choices, starting with the decision made by all parties of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) to pursue diplomacy. The JCPOA put restrictions and monitoring in place, that while imperfect, ensured the world that Iran could not rapidly or effectively develop a nuclear weapon undetected. In 2018, the United States chose to unilaterally withdraw from the agreement and increase sanctions to pursue a “maximum pressure” campaign in hopes of achieving a “better” deal, despite Iran’s compliance and all indications that the existing agreement was working. Without the U.S. upholding its end of the agreement, Iran abandoned the restrictions it had agreed to under the JCPOA, increased its uranium enrichment capacity, and creeped towards a breakout ability to build a nuclear weapon. However, in the nearly seven years since the JCPOA’s collapse, it has chosen not to pursue that breakout—a decision confirmed by U.S. intelligence assessments earlier this year. In the current series of negotiations, the Trump administration imposed a 60-day deadline, which has now passed, with Iran recently announcing it had undertaken provocative capacity-building for its nuclear program. While another round of talks was supposed to take place, Israel chose this moment to act.
Seeing a strategic window that was closing, Israel launched a pre-planned military campaign against Iran’s nuclear program. Iran’s ability to retaliate against Israel was the weakest it had been in decades, as Hezbollah is effectively disabled, Hamas is surrounded, and interference from Syria is out of the picture. Having fended off a massive Iranian missile strike in October of 2024 with a coalition of international partners, Israel probably assessed it could withstand retaliation from Iran. Additionally, aided by recent advances in portable drone technology and tactics, Israel had a plan for disabling Iran’s air defense—which might not be as effective in the future as countries develop more effective defenses to deal with drones. With an extremely friendly (and likely permissive) administration in Washington, Israel seized the opportunity to strike.
However, it’s not yet clear how Israel plans to achieve its somewhat ambiguous objectives. While Israel would clearly prefer regime change, the history of U.S. involvement in the Middle East demonstrates how difficult this is, so as analysts like Trita Parsi have mentioned, Israel is probably hoping for “regime collapse.” If the goal is to increase Iran’s breakout time for a nuclear weapon, this may be feasible, but the delay may ultimately be inconsequential if the end result is ultimately to motivate an Iranian decision to build a bomb. If the goal is to destroy Iran’s nuclear program completely, most analysts seem to agree that doing so would be extremely difficult if not impossible for Israel, as it simply does not possess the forces or equipment to accomplish this. The United States, theoretically, does.
The biggest challenge is the Iranian enrichment facility at Fordow, which is buried deep within a mountain. The IDF does not have bunker busting munitions capable of penetrating deep enough into that mountain to destroy the facility. The U.S. Air Force’s arsenal includes the GBU-57A/B Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP), a 30,000lb bunker busting munition reportedly capable of penetrating 200 feet of reinforced concrete. This bomb was specifically designed to attack deeply buried bunkers and offers the greatest chance of successfully destroying the Fordow enrichment facility, albeit probably requiring multiple strikes. Only the B-2 Spirit stealth bomber is currently capable of carrying the weapon, meaning only the U.S. can deploy it.
While Israel may be unable to directly destroy the facility, it could attack entrance and exit points and collapse those tunnels or attack ventilation or supporting electrical infrastructure that could reduce the usability of the facility or damage the centrifuges inside. Such attacks would likely require routine follow-up attacks to prevent rebuilding and the re-establishment of air defense. The constant air patrols could end up echoing the permanent presence of the Iraqi no-fly zone after the Gulf War. That is untenable.
The decision to directly destroy Fordow will thus fall upon President Trump. Public support for an attack appears to be very low, and Trump has a long but inconsistent history of decrying wars in the Middle East, having made many statements expressing his desire to stay out of any wars. If the U.S. wishes to avoid putting American troops or regional assets and interests at risk, then staying out of this conflict is the best option. But Trump is also known to change his mind frequently and on a whim, and his recent pronouncements via social media have been bellicose, complaining about Iran’s negotiating position and demanding “unconditional surrender!” Since his stated policy is that Iran cannot have a nuclear weapon, a military strike may be the only option to ensure that, since the Israeli attacks will increase Iran’s motivation for a nuclear deterrent.
There may also be a temptation on President Trump’s part, given years of fumbled diplomacy, to seize the opportunity at hand to destroy Iran’s nuclear program completely. Israel’s attack has severely disabled Iran’s anti-aircraft capability, making the prospect of committing U.S. air assets to an attack less daunting. Currently, numerous American military forces are being built up in the region, ostensibly to provide the president with “options,” but once those forces are in place, the temptation to use them in an attempt to eliminate the nuclear problem once and for all is likely to be significant—especially if the Iranians show no indication of being willing to surrender their enrichment capability.
For Iran’s part, it has a vested interest in keeping America out of the conflict, as the cycle of escalation could invite an assault that it could not withstand. If Iran responds to Israeli attacks by attacking U.S. forces or interests, such as launching an attack on U.S. bases in the region or closing the Strait of Hormuz, these actions would almost certainly draw a U.S. military response. Yet an attack on Iranian nuclear facilities would remove any hesitation preventing Iran from attacking U.S. interests and undoubtedly invite the expansion of the conflict into a potentially regional affair.
Iran could also make a strategic blunder by blocking the Strait of Hormuz, which might unite an Arab coalition against the country—a coalition more interested in its immediate economic interests than factoring in public perception about Israeli involvement. Unlike the first Gulf War, when the goal was to keep an international coalition together by keeping Israel out of the conflict, Iranian attacks on its neighbors’ economic interests could render regional disdain for Israel moot. Despite the Saudi-Iranian rapprochement of 2023, the prospect of seizing the moment in a region-wide campaign to finally remove the Iranian threat, including its ties to troublesome militant groups like the Houthis, could prove tempting.
Uncertainty is certain, because as President Trump himself has stated, nobody knows whether he will strike Iran. Regardless of his intention to find a diplomatic resolution to this crisis, Israel’s attack has fundamentally reshaped the current environment and changed the calculus for every actor involved. The threat of military action, combined with economic pressures, forced Iran to the negotiating table in 2015 and 2025, but now that military action has begun, the calculus for achieving an acceptable resolution for all parties has changed. Trump could sit back and assess the success of Israel’s campaign, he could join in to assure the destruction of Fordow, or he could try using the credible threat of military action compel Iran to his will. It’s anyone’s guess at this point, and while the current trajectory of American military movement currently points towards a likely strike, as Trump frequently says, “We’ll see what happens.”
This op-ed was originally published in Arabic at Al Jazeera on June 21, 2025 prior to the U.S. attack on Iranian nuclear facilities.
