U.S. Military equipment in Norway during exercise Joint Viking 25 in March 2025. U.S. Army photo.
Is the Arctic Destined to be the Most Likely Flashpoint for a Nuclear War?
In an op-ed originally published April 27. 2025 at Aljazeera.net, I examine the possibility of conflict in the arctic leading to nuclear war.
Long gone are the days of “duck and cover” drills and fallout shelters in America, when the fears of nuclear war were on the minds of most. For decades, cooler heads prevailed, and the U.S. and Russia worked cooperatively to reduce the risk of nuclear conflict and decrease the size of their arsenals. By 2022, cooperation began disintegrating as Russia’s botched invasion of Ukraine raised serious concerns about nuclear escalation and severely hampered the prospects of future nuclear arms control agreements. With Russia seemingly dismissing the Trump administration’s rather conciliatory efforts to end the war, there appears to be no end in sight, and Europe is feeling the pressure, embarking on a massive effort to boost its own defense.
Amidst these tensions, melting polar ice is opening Arctic sea lanes to increased shipping traffic, resource exploration, and military posturing. NATO’s newest members, Finland and Sweden, are Arctic nations. Russia currently dominates the Arctic region, holding 53% of its total coastline, operating the world’s biggest icebreaker fleet, and has been upgrading its Arctic military bases. China is also increasingly playing a role, conducting joint Arctic military exercises with Russia and employing an icebreaker fleet of its own, despite its complete lack of territory in the Arctic Circle.
But is the Arctic destined to be the most likely flashpoint for a nuclear war? Let’s look at the possibilities.
Despite being so cold, the Arctic is no stranger to military conflict, holding major strategic value and serving as a passageway to both the Atlantic and Pacific. During World War II, the Battle of the Atlantic extended into the Arctic and ships carrying American war supplies to the Soviet Union traversed the Northern Sea Route. Germany invaded Norway, and the Soviet Union invaded Finland in the Winter War of 1940. As the Cold War evolved, the Arctic became a major theater for submarine activity.
Today, President Trump’s insistence on acquiring Greenland “one way or the other” highlights the growing importance of the Arctic to the security interests of the United States. Greenland’s geographic location, combined with the U.S.’ operation of Pituffik Space Base in the high north, provides key “missile warning, missile defense, and space surveillance” capabilities. The shortest flight paths for nuclear missiles between the U.S. and Russia exist over the Arctic Ocean, and the loss of this base on account of a diplomatic blunder could open a key blind spot in America’s strategic defense. Alternatively, the loss of this base to a Russian attack aimed at disabling American missile detection infrastructure is unlikely due to the danger of immediate retaliation and escalation.
Currently, the most likely path to a potential nuclear exchange in the Arctic would be through a conventional or “gray zone” Russian attack on a NATO member. Border skirmishes, cyber-attacks, airspace incursions, reckless military intercepts, and support to separatist groups intentionally sit in the “gray zone” between peace and outright war, but could ultimately lead to open conflict that escalates to nuclear war. Conceivably, a gray zone or overt attack on other Greelandic infrastructure, or an information operations campaign aimed at dividing the U.S., Greenland, and Denmark, are not outside of the realm of possibility.
With NATO’s addition of Sweden and, more importantly, Finland—which shares a 1,343 km border with Russia—there is increased opportunity that a NATO Arctic state could be attacked. Highlighting this risk, American forces in Alaska recently staged a drill in which hundreds of troops were flown to Finland to defend against a mock Russian invasion. Yet rather than an overt invasion of a NATO member, Russia is far more likely test the waters by conducting provocative and destabilizing small-scale gray zone activities. The disastrous results of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have likely raised doubts in Moscow about its ability to achieve its objectives in a direct attack on a nuclear armed country, let alone a large NATO ally, making a direct attack unlikely. It is not entirely clear where the red line on gray zone activities would be for Finland or what would trigger an Article 5 collective defense declaration short of a direct attack across the border.
Though the threat of American nuclear weapons has long-served to deter a Russian attack on the European NATO members, President Trump’s many public pronouncements expressing doubt about his willingness to defend a NATO member that comes under attack has shaken confidence in Europe about America’s commitment. As a result, France and the UK are considering expanding their arsenals, signifying an increased reliance on nuclear posturing for deterrence, including for the defense of Arctic NATO members. France is reconsidering whether it wants to decommission its current warheads as it brings replacements online, potentially doubling of the size of its arsenal. It is simultaneously upgrading an airbase closer to the German border to be able to host nuclear weapons. The UK, which has been historically dependent on the U.S. for its nuclear arsenal, is recently questioning that dependence, and may seek other options to assure an effective and reliable deterrent. This could foretell a new nuclear arms race.
The upcoming February 2026 expiration of New START, the last remaining strategic nuclear arms treaty between the U.S. and Russia, portends a period of nuclear proliferation that could echo the nuclear arms buildups of the Cold War. Meanwhile, China, which has been operating in the Arctic, has been engaging in its own rapid nuclear buildup in an effort to potentially exceed 1,000 warheads by 2035. China has consistently rejected efforts to join a multilateral nuclear arms reduction treaty with the U.S. and Russia, citing its comparatively much smaller nuclear arsenal.
Navigation issues in the Arctic could also lead to military escalations reaching the nuclear level. The Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS), which includes satellite constellations like the American GPS system or Russian GLONASS, sees decreased reliability and accuracy in the Arctic. The reasons for this are abundant, like the orbital inclination of the satellites themselves and ionospheric interference. With increased incidents of Russian GNSS jamming in Europe, it’s conceivable that Russia may employ similar tactics in the Arctic, including spoofing, for the purpose of disruption or causing navigational errors to trigger an exploitable international incident. Military or civilian vessels straying into Russian territory could be captured, their cargoes seized, or crews held hostage for the purpose of conducting hostage diplomacy. Resolving such a confrontation military could quickly spiral out of control.
Yet considering these combined factors, the Arctic does not exist in a vacuum, and there are other regions in which nuclear tensions are rising.
The threat of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan is the most likely scenario for a direct confrontation between the United States and another nuclear power. Though he has not signaled any specific intent to attack, President Xi aims for the Chinese military to be capable of invading Taiwan by 2027. While President Biden indicated his intention to directly aid Taiwan if this occurred, President Trump appears to defer to the traditional American position of strategic ambiguity over the island. Should China decide to invade, and the U.S. responds to defend Taiwan, it is difficult to see Washington opting to detonate a nuclear weapon over an issue that does not directly threaten the U.S. mainland or a NATO ally. On the other hand, a subsequent attack on Chinese mainland military sites in order to disable an attacking Chinese invasion force could plausibly incite a nuclear response.
What is most concerning is that provocative military behavior anywhere could lead to an unintentional cycle of escalation that ultimately results in a nuclear exchange. As the Arctic opens to more military and commercial activity, the frequency of encounters between military forces is likely to increase. As those encounters increase, so too does the probability that an accident or unintended attack may occur. As Russia routinely flies patrols into the Alaska Air Defense Identification Zone, an area of international air space in which the U.S. identifies all aircraft, aggressive behavior by Russian pilots raises the risk of a routine encounter evolving into an international incident. But these aggressive incidents are much more frequent elsewhere, like the Baltic and North Seas. For example, in 2022, a Russian SU-27 fighter jet fired two missiles against a British RC-135 surveillance jet over the Black Sea, but fortunately neither missile hit their target. Similarly, China is known for conducting frequent unsafe intercepts of foreign aircraft in the East and South China Seas.
In the end, the likeliness that the Arctic or any other region sees the confrontation leading to nuclear war is more about the actors involved and the choices they make rather than the regions themselves. Actors committed to the peaceful resolution of disputes will find ways to preserve that peace. Yet in an era of machismo, confrontation, and conquest, we could all find ourselves walking off a dangerous cliff from which there is no return.
