Extremist Groups "Very Much Alive" in Iraq
From an article in today’s Washington Post on the strength of al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and other insurgent groups operating in Iraq:
On the eve of the end of the U.S. combat mission in Iraq, extremist groups “are very much alive,” according to the U.S. Special Forces commander here. Though weakened by the deaths of top leaders and a drop-off in foreign funding, al Qaeda in Iraq’s “cellular structure” remains “pretty much intact.”
This doesn’t come as too much of a surprise actually. As I’ve mentioned before when U.S. officials have claimed that al Qaeda or its affiliates are “broken” or “on the run” because theirleaders were being killed or captured with greater frequency than before, optimistic assessments based on leadership bodycounts hold only just so much relevance with a group like al Qaeda in Iraq. Leadership is important, but AQI remains extremely difficult to “decapitate” in such a way as to render it unable to conduct attacks effectively.
The article mentions that the attacks aren’t as sophisticated as they have been in the past and that the group is outsourcing some of their operations to criminal groups and other elements that aren’t strictly al Qaeda per se. I think it’s also important to note, however, it also alludes to the fact that in the grand scheme of things that might not really matter.
There is value in using the level of sophistication in an attack or group of attacks to determine the strength of the organization behind them, but whether we’re able to believe or say publicly that AQI is weakened, weakening, desperate, or what have you, may have little bearing on their apparently robust ability to capitalize on the political instability that has been intensifying since the March elections and make Iraqis doubt that their government can protect them.
Perceptions matter as much as reality when it comes to the potential for violence to unravel the tenous security situation in Iraq, and as U.S. forces step further back and begin the drawdown process, perception of government vs. insurgent capability will obviously become even more important. If AQI can continue to conduct attacks like the ones in Basra and Ramadi over the weekend, they will be a significant threat to stability regardless of their actual degree of resurgence as measured by leaders killed and whether they engage in criminality or outsource attacks.
As the withdrawal deadline approaches it may become more important to base assessments of the threat environment not on whether AQI today measures up to the AQI of the past, but whether it still has the capability, even through less sophisticated attacks, to conduct attacks sufficient to expose the same fissures that plunged Iraq chaos in years prior.
