Afghan MPs confirm ministers. Source: Afghanistan Analysts Network
Do the Slog Work
By Courtney McCreesh, WiSe Leadership Initiative Fellow
The long, hard work of supporting Afghanistan needs to be a continued priority for the United States for the next two decades or longer. The United States and its NATO allies currently pursue two interconnected missions in Afghanistan: (1) Counter Terrorism and (2) Good Governance / Institution Building . As long as asymmetrical warfare persists, the first mission will continue. The U.S. and its allies will need to contain violence and maintain vigilance. Similarly, as long as Afghanistan lacks effective institutions and accountable governmental ministries, the institutional development mission must be prioritized to build a country from the rubble of war.
The Counter Terrorism mission in Afghanistan is ably addressed by a combination of Department of Defense armed forces, including members of all four branches of service, members of the Special Operations Command, and covert operatives. The governance mission is more fragile. The U.S. government is a vital component of the NATO-led “Train Advise Assist” mission, which includes 13,000 personnel from dozens of countries. Governance is slog work. The United States and its partners have been at it for 15 years, so it seems like it should be wrapping up. But it’s not. There are decades of work ahead. Twenty years is one generation in Afghanistan and it’s five presidential terms for the U.S., but it is what we need to build institutions.
Why Focus on Institutions? The people of Afghanistan have endured poverty and chaos for decades. Under Presidents Karzai and Ghani, Afghanistan created many of the institutions required to provide basic services to the people, but these institutions struggle, particularly in the regions furthest from Kabul. The Ministries of Defense, Interior, and Finance still face enormous staffing challenges and lack a pipeline of professional, dedicated civil servants who are well-trained, fairly paid, and properly rewarded. This effort will require an enormous investment in Human Resources. Additionally, the country still needs assistance with logistics, such as warehouse and supply chain management. Effective institutions will lead to a positive fly wheel for success, whereas weak institutions will allow continued power vacuums in the region.
What Can Leaders Do? Americans largely understand that if something is worth doing, it’s worth doing right. One of the jobs of America’s national security leadership is reminding American citizens that assisting Afghanistan is still worth doing. America’s national security leadership, including the president, the secretaries of State and Defense, and the National Security Council need to understand and communicate the importance of, and accordingly prioritize, institution building in Afghanistan.
What Happens if Afghanistan Becomes Weaker? If the United States and its NATO allies abandon these admittedly daunting tasks – there is no telling what kinds of non-state actors may abscond with government resources – and for what nefarious purposes. Afghanistan borders Pakistan. Bruce Riedel, former CIA official who led the 2009 review of President Obama’s Afghanistan policy, has called Pakistan “the most dangerous country in the world.” The porous border between Pakistan and Afghanistan’s mountainous and tribal regions are fertile ground for the exact types of training camps that incubated terrorists in the 1990s. Abandoning the slog work of assisting the Afghans in securing their country has global consequences.
Why Now: The Afghan security forces are working hard everyday to repel advancing Taliban fighters, but that does not mean that training and advising is subservient to the military mission. Indeed, hundreds of thousands of refugees, who have been living for years in Pakistan or parts of Europe, are now returning to Afghanistan, and they desperately need the services of a well-functioning bureaucracy. These refugees are not eager to return to Afghanistan during this perilous time (a brutally cold winter, which will be followed by a spring fighting season), but political conditions between Afghanistan and its neighbors have deteriorated. The U.S. is experiencing a change in administration, but it should not waver in its commitment to the Afghan ministries in the years to come. This investment in people and priorities is worth it. Foreign aid is not a substitute for foreign presence. It is good that donor nations have reconfirmed their financial commitment to Afghanistan’s solvency (particularly at the October 2016 Brussels Conference on Afghanistan), but money is a poor substitute for commitment, which is what President Ghani wants, and deserves, from invested nations.
