A Department of Defense Chart Outlining Operation Midnight Hammer.
After the U.S. Attack on Iran’s Nuclear Facilities, What Comes Next?
The U.S. attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities this past weekend was an impressive tactical achievement that, in the long-run, will probably fail to achieve its strategic objectives. U.S. policy has long been aimed at preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. Dealing with Iran’s potential nuclear ambitions has always been about three choices: doing nothing (which has never been an acceptable option), negotiating an agreement (which the U.S. achieved successfully in 2015 and sabotaged in 2018), or going to war (likely requiring more than just an air campaign). With the diplomatic option made infinitely harder by breaking its own deal, the U.S. took a back seat to an Israeli military campaign that severely hampers any remaining ability to diplomatically constrain Iran’s nuclear program.
As the leverage of a potential military strike to compel the Iranians diplomatically was erased by Israel’s attack, President Trump appeared encouraged by the impressive tactical success of the campaign, and opted to deliver what he viewed as means of ensuring the destruction of Iran’s nascent nuclear capacity. The resulting operation was as masterpiece of execution. The deployment of seven B-2 Spirit stealth bombers dropping fourteen GBU-57 bunker busters on Iranian nuclear facilities, along with a decoy flight of several more B-2s, represents at least half of the entire U.S stealth bomber fleet. Over one hundred other aircraft were involved, and there were no American casualties. From a maintenance, logistical, coordination, and overall tactical standpoint, this was a monumental achievement.
Examining the Results of the Bombing
While all of the GBU-57s appear to have been dropped on target, the overall strategic value of this strike remains in serious doubt. Reporting on early intelligence assessments indicate that the strikes may not have destroyed key components on the Iranian nuclear program. Numerous analysts examining the results of the strike have noted that the storage tunnels at Isfahan do not appear to have been hit with bunker busting munitions. Further analysis indicates that there is uncertainty as to the current location of the highly enriched uranium stored at that location, with Vice President J.D. Vance admitting as much. Echoing similar concerns, a group of trucks was spotted at Fordow a few days prior to the strike, with the possibility they could have removed any number of nuclear assets.
As the Carnegie Endowment’s James Acton notes, Iran likely has retained a significant portion of its enriched uranium, which is stored in small, easily transportable containers. It still retains a significant stockpile of centrifuge components that the international community has been unable to track since the first Trump administration sabotaged the JCPOA. Despite Israel’s efforts, it still retains expertise, and the ability to reconstitute elements of its nuclear program in small, hidden facilities, without an international monitoring or inspection element. The result, as Acton explains, is that Iran could potentially still build a nuclear bomb within a year of deciding to do so.
The American and Israeli attacks have now provided Iran with the justification to do just that. Faced with the impotence of its own conventional military capacity on full display for the world, the embarrassing destruction of its air defenses, and the resulting loss of its psychological deterrent factor, Iran is significantly more likely to make a run for the one thing that could potentially deter a foreign attack—a nuclear arsenal. Considering that the U.S. intelligence community had continued to assess that Iran had not yet made the decision to build a bomb, the decision to build one as a result of this attack would amount to a strategic failure on the part of the U.S. and Israel.
Iranian Retaliation
Iran’s military retaliation yesterday targeted U.S. forces in the region—but it does not appear that this attack was intended to necessarily escalate or kill. After notifying Qatar in advance of the impending attack, Iran launched an initial volley of missiles at Al Udeid airbase, the largest U.S. base in the region. The Iranian Foreign Ministry subsequently released a statement claiming Iran fired the same number of missiles as bombs dropped by the U.S. At fourteen missiles, this indicated an attempt by the Iranian regime to save face in a way that was less-provocative and less-likely to result in an American counterattack, while simultaneously serving a narrative of proportionality. In a bizarre act, President Trump even thanked Iran for its restraint and early notice in its attack on U.S. forces.
Regional Consequences
This entire episode has broken a number of taboos in the region, the first being conducting an overt, large-scale direct attack on Iran. These attacks indicated to Iran that both the Israeli and U.S. threat of using force is credible, and that fear of escalation has not deterred either country. With that fear diminished, Iran may also view the hesitance against conducting a regime change operation as diminished, and seek a more effective means of preventing it—i.e. a nuclear deterrent. Another broken taboo is Iran attacking a state other than Israel or Iraq. Launching missiles against Al Udeid airbase in Qatar, with which Iran has friendly relations, could reshape countries’ willingness to host U.S. military forces and thus become targets themselves, create more regional hostility towards Israel for its role in the conflict, or possibly unite more countries against Iran. It’s notable that in a meeting with Iran’s ambassador, Qatar “affirmed” its right to respond to the attack, though that does not appear likely at this time.
What Comes Next?
At the time of this writing, there appears to be a cease fire in place, but the prospects for it holding aren’t high. Both the U.S. and Israel are performing battle damage assessments and relying on intelligence to determine whether their goals are met. If not, it’s conceivable that Israel, operating under no real restraints, would act again. Understanding its military inferiority and striving to prevent further damage, Iran is currently unlikely to launch any attacks in overt fashion, but it may choose to act through its remaining regional proxies, through cyber attacks, or other less-attributable means.
For each country in this conflict, a key decision point is approaching quickly. Will Iran seek out alternative means of retribution as mentioned above? Will it continue its strategy of enriching uranium in order to stockpile near-weapons grade material for a breakout? Or will it pursue an entirely clandestine program to establish a nuclear deterrent? Will it return to the negotiating table, and if so, will it be to stall for time or to negotiate relief and assurances for surrendering its program? Given President Trump’s frequently changing policies, withdrawal from the JCPOA, and the way he has summarily dismissed even his own negotiated treaties like the USMCA, it’s entirely understandable why Iran might not put any faith in the guarantees of a signed document with the United States.
Israel accomplished two primary goals in this conflict: damaging/delaying Iran’s nuclear program, and drawing the United States into the conflict. By involving the United States, Israel increased the effectiveness of its overall attack and added specific tactical destructive capacity it did not possess. From this point, Israel’s battle damage assessment will determine whether the level of destruction and delay is adequate, or whether it will need to pursue further military activity. It may opt to wait and judge the outcome of any further negotiations, but will also undoubtedly continue to sow doubt on Iran’s trustworthiness in any negotiated agreement. This is why verification, and not trust, is essential.
For the United States, there is no public appetite for this conflict resuming or expanding into something regional or requiring an Iraq-style regime change operation. President Trump appears to be leaning towards a new set of negotiations, but the effect on Iran’s negotiating position is not yet known. The full U.S. battle damage assessment is still forthcoming, and it will likely seek to find out what happened to the nuclear materials stored at the sites it attacked. If it determines those materials are still intact, and the negotiations are not fruitful, it’s conceivable that we will see a repeat of the past few weeks, but it’s also not clear that the air defense situation will be as clear then as it is now.
Regardless of any of these options, it’s clear that the Iranian nuclear saga is not yet over, and that the coming months will determine the future of the Middle East for generations. The situation is still very fluid, and calm, rational, strategic decision making will be essential for all parties going forward.
