The Radicalization of Faisal Shahzad
An article in yesterday’s New York Times detailing Faisal Shahzad’s path to radicalization notes that Shahzad:
a) Was a Pakistani immigrant living in America who felt unfulfilled and alienated from the society in which he lived, b) found solace, companionship, and validation with friends of similar backgrounds in similar circumstances, c) became increasingly radicalized through social network connections, d) sought and obtained introductions to extremist groups through those personal connections, and e) eventually turned to violence not out of religion fanaticism, but out of a sense of duty to his friends and fellow Muslims.
Though the Times portrays this as a break from the past, this pattern is really nothing new. It’s literally right out of Marc Sageman’s 2004 book Understanding Terror Networks, which includes the Times’ supposedly different “9/11 era jihadist leaders” in its sample. In many ways, the Shahzad case is as textbook as you can get.
The interesting thing for me, and a point that I think risks being glossed over as the discussion on Shahzad continues, is the degree to which specific events are identified as catalysts in the radicalization process. More so than in other cases, the pivot points where Shahzad’s extremist leanings led to violence are clearly identified in the article and I think that’s worth a little more examination.
Specifically, though his isolation and dissatisfaction led him to reach out to extremist networks online, and social bonds with extremists in Pakistan greatly accelerated his radicalization, the article notes that the most signficant catalysts and accelerants that galvanized Shahzad to actually commit acts of violence were specific policies and actions undertaken by the U.S. and Pakistani governments namely: 1) Pakistan’s U.S.-supported storming of the Red Mosque in which he had often prayed, and 2) U.S. Drone strikes occurring in Pakistan while he was living in Peshawar:
Of the Red Mosque incident:
If before the siege Mr. Shahzad and Mr. Hussain were on the sidelines of militancy, ‘they heated up after what happened,’ said a person familiar with the case. ‘They realized that more than sympathy was required.’
And of the drone strikes:
While Shahzad was staying with his parents in Peshawar, he became incensed by American-led drone strikes in the tribal region of Pakistan…Mr. Shahzad, who is of Pashtun lineage, called Mr. Hussain and said, ‘They’re killing Pashtuns.’
Mr. Hussain was ‘against innocent people dying in the tribal areas because of the drone strikes,’ his brother Khalid Hussain, said in an interview, adding that most Pakistanis shared that view.
[Shahzad] also told the judge that “until the hour the U.S. pulls its forces from Iraq and Afghanistan”; halts drone strikes in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia; and stops killing Muslims, “we will be attacking U.S. and I plead guilty to that.”
Clearly it would be inaccurate to say that U.S. or Pakistani kinetic operations are the sole reason that Shahzad became radicalized or that we should discount the psychological and social factors that helped to frame his view of U.S. foreign policy and set him on the path to extremism.
I do think it is important, however, that in our efforts to discover what sort of overwhelming pressures or psychological aberrations could possibly have driven this apparently “normal” young man to attempt such terrible acts we don’t completely overlook what have been pretty clearly identified as the triggers both by “people close to the case” and by Shahzad himself.
Though characters like Jihad Jane/Jamie and some other recent would-be terrorists have apparently latched onto extremism primarily for emotional solace, self-aggrandizement, or to channel anger born of fairly obvious psychological imbalances, it’s critical to consider the likelihood that there are cases where the “he was disgruntled, isolated, and generally upset, so he went out to join the Taliban and find himself” view only gets you so far.
In trying to figure out why individuals and groups of individuals become radicalized and/or turn to violence, I think this case makes it clearer than most how important it is to recognize that, more so than some other more indirect cornerstones of jihadist rhetoric suggesting that the U.S. trying killing Muslims, dramatic increases in drone strikes that are widely reported to in fact kill Muslims, are highly likely to push people who may already be radicalized for other reasons and through other means to commit acts of violence.
This is obviously not to condone extremism or acts based on an extremist view of U.S. policy. It is critical to consider, however, that, right or wrong, those policies’ visibility and unique ability to provoke visceral reactions in Muslims worldwide will likely continue to exert a radicalizing and catalyzing effect on those who are already either vulnerable to or already subscribers to extremist beliefs.
Running to point the crazy, depressed, or lonely finger without also examining this other, more uncomfortable fact risks painting an incomplete picture and hampering our ability to face the radicalization threat with a clear-eyed and strategically-oriented view in the future.
