State Department Report on Terror Trends
The State Department issued its annual report on terror trends today. Country Reports on Terrorism is a Congressionally mandated document on the terror threat. There are numerous findings summarized in the report’s strategic assessment. Several follow, along with my additional comments and assessments.
“Al-Qa’ida (AQ) and associated networks remained the greatest terrorist threat to the United States and its partners in 2007. It has reconstituted some of its pre-9/11 operational capabilities through the exploitation of Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), replacement of captured or killed operational lieutenants, and the restoration of some central control by its top leadership, in particular Ayman al-Zawahiri.”
This finding unsurprisingly echoes recent National Intelligence Estimates on the terrorist threat. AQ has also expanded its organizational ties to previously autonomous groups in North Africa and elsewhere. We should also be asking whether “operational capacity” is a useful measure. Given the increasing prevalence of self-motivated jihadists, the bigger challenge may be the ability of AQ to encourage others rather than its ability to conceive, plan, and implement attacks centrally.
“Afghanistan remained threatened by Taliban and other insurgent groups and criminal gangs, some of whom were linked to AQ and terrorist sponsors outside the country.”
We do not have a good response to this situation. The appointment of General David Petraeus to head Central Command suggests that his efforts to try to bring the Iraq model to Afghanistan will be given a chance. Given the multiple alternative explanations for progress in Iraq — buying off the Sunnis, the completion of ethnic cleansing, etc — Afghanistan looks to be very much a real test case for Petraeus’ counter-insurgency model.
“Iran remained the most significant state sponsor of terrorism.”
This is a judgment call, of course. Iran has, at most, very limited interactions with AQ. Iran may be in some measure the most significant state sponsor of terrorism, but certainly it is much easier to trace anti-American groups and violence to groups linked to Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. Should the United States be concerned with all terrorism equally? Or should the United States focus primarily on groups with the demonstrated capability and desire to strike at the United States and U.S. interests abroad? Depending on how one answers that question, one can come up with different answers about which state is indeed the most significant state sponsor of terrorism.
“In Colombia, the FARC exemplified another trend: growing links between terrorist and other criminal activity.”
We are seeing similar dynamics in Afghanistan as well, and this link fundamentally undermines efforts to control terrorist financing through better controls over financial institutions and charities.
“Responding to terrorist groups that have many of the characteristics of a global insurgency – propaganda campaigns, grass roots support, and political and territorial ambitions, though ill-defined, requires a comprehensive response. Successful methods include a focus on protecting and securing the population; and politically and physically marginalizing the insurgents, winning the support and cooperation of at-risk populations by targeted political and development measures, and conducting precise intelligence-led special operations to eliminate critical enemy elements with minimal collateral damage.”
The definition of the terrorist threat as a global insurgency profoundly confuses the issue. Insurgencies are typically movements that seek to replace an existing government with a new one within a defined territory. There are clearly some terrorist groups that have these sorts of aims, but when a group like AQ strikes at the United States it is at most an indirect insurgency since we do not actually control any of the territories they would ultimately like to rule. That fact introduces a very basic challenge — the United States cannot defeat the Taliban on behalf of the Afghan government, only the Afghan government can defeat the Taliban ultimately. And while the United States may be able to help, U.S. involvement is itself a delegitimizing factor for the Afghan government. The insurgency model tries to impose a simple framework on a complex situation, and in a basic way may be leading American policy astray.
“Counter-radicalization is a key policy priority for the United States, particularly in Europe, given the potential of Europe-based violent extremism to threaten the United States and its key interests directly.”
What does this mean in practice? Radicalization is an inevitable consequence of thwarting people’s political aspirations. As long as there is an Islamist movement that seeks political power or autonomy, there will be radicals. There are three possible courses of action — promote secularism, encourage power sharing, or support massive relocation of populations to reverse immigration trends. None of these is politically palatable or even wise. So what precisely does a “counter-radicalization” policy look like other than something akin to “Just Say No to Blowing Stuff Up”?
“The key success factor in confronting violent extremism is the commitment by governments to work with each other, with the international community, with private sector organizations, and with their citizens and immigrant populations.”
The Bush Administration has a very state-centric view of international politics, even when dealing with non-state actors. In this case, it has led us to believe that the answers to radicalism in a place like Pakistan can be found with the Pakistani government, hence our eagerness to support Musharref in all his travails. There are actually very good reasons to be skeptical of the utility or viability of an American policy that seeks to engage the rest of the world primarily at a state-level.
