Winning Hearts and Minds
In an op-ed in the Financial Times last month (“Al-Qaeda Is Losing The War Of Minds,” March 5, 2008), former Bush Administration official Peter Wehner argues that, “in large measure because of what is unfolding in Iraq, the tide within the Islamic world is beginning to run strongly against al-Qaeda.” Unfortunately, Mr. Wehner’s assertions dramatically oversimplify developments within the Islamic world. And the evidence to support his case that Iraq “could turn out to be a positive and even pivotal event in our struggle against militant Islam” is, simply, not on his side.
As troop increases in Iraq were beginning to quell the bloodshed there last year, terrorist attacks claimed by jihadist groups around the world continued to surge upward, even when excluding attacks in Iraq and Afghanistan and those related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, according to data from the U.S. government’s National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC). It is becoming increasingly clear that Iraq is not the central front in the “war on terror.” Indeed, as our assessment argues progress there is fundamentally disconnected from the struggle against the broader global jihadist movement.
Three dynamics largely explain why, despite a downturn in violence in Iraq, jihadist carnage around the world continues to increase.
First, what has happened in Iraq in recent months was already largely in line with the existing preference of the jihadists. Osama bin Laden’s deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, pointedly warned Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, then leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, about using too much violence, especially against fellow Muslims. Zawahiri’s warnings were not heeded in Anbar and elsewhere and, as a result, al-Qaeda’s influence in Iraq has waned. But this is not ultimately as much a repudiation of al-Qaeda’s approach as it is a reinforcement of its preference for striking at the “far enemy” (the United States and the West) rather than the “near enemy” (“apostate” regimes in the Middle East and the Shi’a).
Second, it is not clear that any of the debate within the Islamist movement has much to do with the legitimacy of anti-American violence. The desire to rein in the casualties among Muslim civilians is clear and quite understandable. Less clear is the standing of the arguments legitimizing violence against American civilians and American government agents.
Third, the key issue is not the abstract justification—or the lack of justification—for Islamist violence reflected in the poll numbers Mr. Wehner notes, but rather the belief that the use of violence is justified because it is fundamentally an act of self-defense.
The establishment of a new caliphate has always been little more than a long-term aspiration of the jihadist movement, much as the desire to spread human rights, democracy and free markets is for us. Jihad abroad is not about this yearning, but is usually justified in the short-term as a necessary defense of Muslims. As long as Muslims in large numbers believe that American foreign policy is aimed at dividing and weakening the Muslim world, jihadist violence will remain high regardless of whether terrorism is considered legitimate or not.
We believe that killing is wrong, but we also believe that we have a right to defend ourselves. Understandably, Muslims feel the same way. We won’t win the war of ideas until we recognize that our actions have inadvertently caused many Muslims to see us as a threat.
