Rose Gottemoeller on the Future of U.S. Arms Control Efforts
Where do we go after New START? Assistant Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller gave a sense of the administration’s answer to that question in a recent speech.
Future U.S.-Russia Arms Control Efforts
We are preparing for entry into force of New START, including for the exchange of Treaty-required notifications that begins immediately upon entry into force and the initial exchange of data on missiles, launchers, heavy bombers and warheads subject to the Treaty, which is required 45 days after entry into force. And much work is taking place to prepare for the first on-site inspections. The right to conduct on-site inspections begins 60 days after entry into force.
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[A]nother major step forward was taken in our relationship with Russia last week when Ambassador Beyrle and Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov exchanged diplomatic notes to bring the so-called “123 Agreement” into force. This is an agreement for nuclear cooperation which both sides have been intent on bringing into force for some time. The agreement provides several areas of benefit, but the one I would like to mention here pertains to enhancing cooperation on important global nonproliferation goals. The 123 Agreement will create the conditions for improved cooperation on joint technology development to support arms control and nonproliferation activities. It will also provide the necessary legal framework for joint efforts to convert research reactors from highly-enriched uranium to low enriched uranium fuel
Tactical Nuclear Weapons
The New START Treaty sets the stage for further limits on and reductions in nuclear arms. As President Obama stated when he signed the New START Treaty in Prague on April 8th of last year, once the Treaty enters into force, the United States intends to pursue with Russia further reductions in strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons, including non-deployed nuclear weapons.
During the ratification process, the Senate made clear its strong interest in addressing the disparity in tactical nuclear weapons between the United States and Russia. The Resolution of Advice and Consent calls for the United States to seek to initiate negotiations with Russia on non-strategic nuclear weapons within a year of entry into force of the Treaty.
Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty
[W]e stand ready to begin multilateral negotiations immediately on a verifiable FMCT at the Conference on Disarmament…The United States is deeply disappointed over the Conference on Disarmament’s failure to begin negotiations.
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
For some time, we have been doing our essential ‘homework’ necessary for a successful CTBT ratification effort.
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After an absence of eight years, U.S. experts are fully engaged in preparatory work to establish the On-Site Inspection element of the verification regime, as part of the U.S. contribution to the work of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization.
These actions demonstrate the commitment of the United States to prepare for the entry into force of this Treaty. We will continue to take additional steps to reinforce the norm against nuclear testing in the months ahead.
The domestic political climate will heavily influence the administration’s next moves. New START treaty ratification was a more difficult fight than many expected, leaving some observers pessimistic about arms control in the Senate.
Despite that difficulty, however, the New START treaty debate was an opportunity for various constituencies to have a robust discussion on the purpose and future of the U.S. nuclear deterrent. Topics like tactical nuclear weapons reductions, nuclear weapons modernization, and international inspections are now far more salient. Nuclear security advocates can advance practical solutions to a Senate that is more educated and engaged on their issues. This is not an opportunity to be squandered.
